The Effect of Approval Balloting on Strategic Voting under Alternative Decision Rules
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3223872 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Samuel Merrill (0000-0002-9572-5922, Wilkes University), Jack H Nagel (University of Pennsylvania), Jack Nagel |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 81 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 509-524 |
| Publication date | 1987-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1961964 |
| OpenAlex | W2051483614 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 14 |
Voting systems combine balloting methods with decision rules or procedures. Most analyses of approval voting (a balloting method) assume it will be combined with plurality rule but advocates often urge its use with more complex procedures. Because much of the case for approval balloting hinges on its encouragement of sincere voting, we ask whether it retains this advantage when combined with multistage procedures. After distinguishing five forms of sincere and insincere approval voting, we find that certain elements of multistage procedures promote departures from purely sincere strategies, including, in some instances, strictly insincere voting. However, most strategic approval voting involves truncating the approved list, including bullet-voting, which is especially likely under certain threshold rules. Coalitions also increase members' incentive to truncate. We conclude that approval balloting with plurality rule remains preferable to conventional single-vote plurality, but we urge caution and further research regarding combining approval balloting with multistage rules
Approval voting · Bullet voting · Business · Cardinal voting systems · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies
Voter coordination in elections
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
Simulation
A minimax procedure for electing committees
Approval voting in practice
Optimal sophisticated voting strategies in single ballot elections involving three candidates
The paradox of grading systems
The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting
The Debate over Electoral Systems
Voluntary PR Voting” in the Election of Swiss Regional Governments
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
A Debut for Approval Voting
The impact of decision rules in multi-candidate campaigns
Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections
Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems
"A Careful Look at "Another Look at Approval Voting
Presidential Primaries
Another Look at Approval Voting
Assessing the Candidate Preference Function
Strategic Electoral Choice in Multi-Member Districts
The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting
Approval Voting
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 2024 (34) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |