God, Moral Requirements, and the Limits of Freedom

Bibliographic Data

ID3225575
AuthorsLaura W Ekstrom (0000-0002-1665-5146, William & Mary, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume12
Issue5
Pages285
Publication date2021-04-21
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligions (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2077-1444 • E-ISSN: 2077-1444
PublisherMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/rel12050285
OpenAlexW3155025833
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited10

This article addresses James Sterba's recent argument for the conclusion that God's existence is incompatible with the degree and amount of evil in the world. I raise a number of questions concerning the moral principles that Sterba suggests God would be required to follow, as well as with respect to the analogy he draws between the obligations of a just state and the obligations of God. Against Sterba's proposed justified divine policy of constraint on human freedom, I ask: What would motivate a perfect being to create human beings who imagine, intend, and freely begin to carry out horrific actions that bring harm to other human beings, to nonhuman animals, and to the environment? I argue that the rationale is lacking behind the thought that God would only interfere with the completion of the process of human beings' bringing to fruition their horrifically harmful intended outcomes, rather than creating beings with different psychologies and abilities altogether. I end by giving some friendly proposals that help to support Sterba's view that God, by nature, would be perfectly morally good

Analogy · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Free will · Harm · Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Law · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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