The New American Way of War

Bibliographic Data

ID3238375
AuthorsMax Boot (corresponding author)
Year2003
Volume82
Issue4
Pages41
Publication date2003-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueForeign Affairs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0015-7120 • E-ISSN: 2327-7793
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/20033648
OpenAlexW100332902
LanguageEN
Citations received26

THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR. That phrase-popularized by the military historian Russell Weigley in his 1973 book-has come to refer to a grinding strategy of attrition: the strategy employed by Ulysses S. Grant to destroy Robert E. Lee's army in 1864-65, by John J. Pershing to wear down the German army in 1918, and by the U.S. Army Air Force to pulverize all the major cities of Germany and Japan in 1944-45. In this view, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II were won not by tactical or strategic brilliance but by the sheer weight of numbers-the awesome destructive power that only a frilly mobilized and highly industrialized democracy can bring to bear. In all these conflicts, U.S. armies composed of citizen-soldiers suffered and inflicted massive casualties. Much the same methods characterized the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, though with decreasing levels of success; the former being a costly draw, the latter a bloody failure. The first GulfWar was much more successful, but in many ways, it still fit the traditional, fire power-intensive mode: more than five weeks of relentless bombing was followed by a massive armored onslaught. Although the left hook that swept around Iraqi forces entrenched in Kuwait showed some operational flair, it was hardly a gamble-the eight-division allied force was so heavy that it simply crushed everything in its path

Development economics · Economic history · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Sociology · History · Military and Defense Studies · Military History and Strategy · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

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