Are Strikes Less Effective in Conglomerate Firms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3247903 |
|---|---|
| Authors | D Rose (0000-0003-4035-4922, corresponding author), David C Rose (0000-0001-9828-1119) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 131-144 |
| Publication date | 1991-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Industrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/001979399104500109 |
| OpenAlex | W1991950660 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
The author develops an extension of the Ashenfelter-Johnson model of union wage bargaining to account for how diversification can improve a firm's ability to take strikes and therefore reduce wage settlements. To test the model, a wage equation is derived that is conditioned on the occurrence of a strike and is then estimated using union wage settlement data for 15 manufacturing firms covering contract settlements from 1954 to 1988. The estimation results support organized labor's contention that conglomerate firms enjoy a significant bargaining advantage over labor unions
Business · Collective bargaining · Conglomerate · Diversification (marketing strategy) · Economics · Geochemistry · Human settlement · Industrial organization · Labour economics · Settlement (finance) · Wage · Wage bargaining · Engineering · Finance · Firm Innovation and Growth · Geology · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |