Are Supreme Court Nominations a Move-the-Median Game
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 3328076 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Charles M Cameron (0000-0003-0421-9870, Princeton University, autor correspondente), Jonathan P Kastellec (0000-0002-7338-248X, Princeton University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2016 |
| Volume | 110 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 778-797 |
| Data de publicação | 2016-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055416000496 |
| OpenAlex | W3124641662 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 10 |
| Referências citadas | 34 |
We conduct a theoretical and empirical re-evaluation of move-the-median (MTM) models of Supreme Court nominations-the one theory of appointment politics that connects presidential selection and senatorial confirmation decisions. We develop a theoretical framework that encompasses the major extant models, formalizing the tradeoff between concerns about the location of the new median justice versus concerns about the ideology of the nominee herself. We then use advances in measurement and scaling to place presidents, senators, justices, and nominees on the same scale, allowing us to test predictions that hold across all model variants. We find very little support for MTM theory. Senators have been much more accommodating of the president's nominees than MTM theory would suggest-many have been confirmed when the theory predicted they should have been rejected. These errors have been consequential: presidents have selected many nominees who are much more extreme than MTM theory would predict. These results raise serious questions about the adequacy of MTM theory for explaining confirmation politics and have important implications for assessing the ideological composition of the Court
Economic Justice · Extant taxon · Ideology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Selection (genetic algorithm · Sociology · Supreme court · Test (biology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies
Presidents and the Status Quo
Presidential Selection of Supreme Court Nominees
Party Defection in Senate Confirmations of Executive Nominees
Political Context, White House Centralization, and the Timing of Presidential Nominations to the Federal Courts
Justice Bork, or, be careful which supreme court nominees you choose to fight
Pivotal Politics as Normal Science
Policy Making and Appointments under Electoral and Judicial Constraints
Giving to the Extreme? Experimental Evidence on Donor Response to Candidate and District Characteristics
The Power to Appoint
Case selection and Supreme Court pivots
The Judicial Common Space
Going Public When Opinion Is Contested
Confirmation Politics and The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Sunk Costs and Market Structure
Democracy as a Latent Variable
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Bargaining Power in the Supreme Court
Advising and Consenting in the 60-Vote Senate
The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees
Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees
Polarizing the Electoral Connection
Voting for Justices
Presidential Capital and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process
Roll Calls, Party Labels, and Elections
Senator Opposition to Supreme Court Nominations
Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process
Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency
Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games
The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations
Congress, Lawmaking, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1971–2000
Supreme Court Appointments as a Move‐the‐Median Game
Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions
Lobbying for Justice
Explaining the Vote
A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting
Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees
Courting Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas
The Supreme Court's Many Median Justices
| Obras citantes distintas | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,25 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 10 |