"Cool Reflexion" and the Criticism of Values

Is, Ought, and Objectivity in Hume's Social Science

Bibliographic Data

ID3340470
AuthorsStephen G Salkever (Bryn Mawr College, corresponding author)
Year1980
Volume74
Issue1
Pages70-77
Publication date1980-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/1955647
OpenAlexW1988884370
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited11

Is the fact/value distinction incompatible with the possibility of a social science which is both objective and evaluative (or normative)? Does support of the latter require rejection of the former and vice versa? This article presents an indirect argument against the incompatibility of the fact/value distinction and an objectively evaluative social science. My procedure is to show that David Hume, whose is/ought distinction is the locus classicus of the fact/value distinction, is committed both to the view that values cannot be derived from facts and to the view that social science is not (and should not be) value-neutral. Furthermore, Hume's position is free from any logical flaws. My conclusion is that it is false to say that the fact/value distinction entails a value-neutral social science, and that it is therefore utterly unnecessary for critics of such a science to waste their time attempting to "bridge the gap" between facts and values

Argument (complex analysis · Criticism · Economics · Epistemology · Normative · Objectivity (philosophy · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

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