Why Do High-Income Democrats Support Redistribution? The Roles of Partisanship, Racial Attitudes and Fiscal Populism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3343379 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Karyn Vilbig (0009-0009-9938-6241, New York University New York New York USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 30-41 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-23 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Sociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1315 • E-ISSN: 1468-4446 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-4446.70032 |
| PMID | 40988112 |
| OpenAlex | W4414484629 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 50 |
Since the 1990s, high-income individuals have increasingly sorted into the Democratic Party as a result of their socially liberal views. There is evidence that over time high-income Democrats have also liberalized in their economic attitudes, but the motivations behind this purported support remain unclear. This study uses a forced-choice conjoint experiment with an oversample of high-income respondents and takes the novel approach of pairing the experiment with cognitive interviews in order to explore why high-income Democrats support redistributive policies. Results show that the redistributive preferences of high-income Democrats look very similar to those of other Democrats. They prefer policies proposed by their own party. They want policies that are racially "fair," and sometimes define this to mean favoring Black recipients. Most of all, however, they are driven by a commitment to "fiscal populism," the idea that (increased) government spending should be funded by the most elite members of society
Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Social Policy and Reform Studies
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The Politics of Resentment
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The white working-class minority
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Narratives of Response Error From Cognitive Interviews of Survey Questions About Normative Behavior
Racism without Racists
Hijacking the Agenda
An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
The New Fiscal Sociology
A Suggested Index of the Association of Social Class and Voting
Changes in Americans’ Racial Attitudes Have Increased Support for Welfare
The Structure of American Income Tax Policy Preferences
Where Self-Interest Trumps Ideology
What Do Partisan Donors Want
The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics
Identification of Preferences in Forced-Choice Conjoint Experiments
Polarization of the Rich
Bridging the Blue Divide
The Hidden American Immigration Consensus
The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States
Taxation and the worlds of welfare
Class Politics and Political Change in the United States, 1952-1992
Secular Partisan Realignment in the United States
Partisans without Constraint
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |