Kings as Judges

This bold and ambitious book marries history and political theory to solve the riddle of why representative institutions emerged in the West, pre-eminently in England rather than elsewhere. The question is hardly novel, but the solution is. For Boucoyannis, the origins of liberalism and constitutionalism lie not in rights conceded by weak rulers but, on the contrary, in a strong central authority imposing collective obligations on the most powerful interest groups in the state. The demands for rights and the outcomes prized in modern liberal democratic states are not primary but secondary, the products of representation rather than its cause. This argument, contradicting previous interpretations, she calls “the normative empirical inversion.” Eschewing both idealist and materialist perspectives, she places justice and the control of justice by a strong state at the center of her argument. A corollary of the strong-state hypothesis is that the form of polity often known as “absolutism” and held to be characteristic of pre-modern societies is in fact a symptom of weak central government.The analysis is characterized by a theoretically informed empirical investigation. Key concepts are state capacity, compellence, polity-wide representative institutions, functional layering, institutional fusion, and territorial anchoring. The ability of a state or a ruler to compel the attendance of its nobility at a central representative institution is crucial, as is an institution’s reach across the entire polity. Although Boucoyannis argues that justice is the key component, the combining of functions, primarily the addition of taxation but also legislation, within a single institution is also vital. Another important element is territory-wide anchoring through the integration of local structures with a central assembly. Regularity is not everything, however; broad-based participation in parliament should also be achieved. Ruler capacity and noble presence are primal in the emergence of representative institutions, but the continual flow of royal power enables full realization. Boucoyannis’ empirical study ostensibly reveals that England best matches these theoretical requirements.The work proceeds via a series of case studies set against the English paradigm. It looks for similarities and differences in form and function. The specific studies also serve to counter rival interpretive models, the intrinsic flaws of which have been intimated at the outset. Among them are geopolitical, bellicist, and distanced-based accounts, all based on fiscal bargaining, as well as historical institutional explanations such as bicameral versus tricameral assemblies. Boucoyannis provides a separate chapter to show that contractarianism—bargaining over taxation—is not the key to effective representation but rather a “fiscal fixation” within social science. Among the case studies are the cities of Italy and the Low Countries, enabling Boucoyannis to examine the degree to which trade and communal assemblies constituted an alternative path to representation. An excursus into the role of towns in England shows mercantile power to have been of secondary significance.Turning her attention to northeastern Europe, Boucoyannis demonstrates that the key factor, once again, was the relationship between an entrenched nobility and the restricted capacity of kings. The highest achievement there was “second-best constitutionalism,” lacking deep roots. Russia witnessed representative activity, but the independence of the boyar nobility and weak infrastructure combined to limit the Crown’s power, notwithstanding the service orientation of the “provincial gentry.” There, as elsewhere, “despotism” was a coping mechanism deployed by a weak state. The final substantive chapter deals with petitioning and the differing histories of corporate responsibility in England, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire.A short review cannot hope to encapsulate the breadth of treatment and the depth of reasoning in this remarkable book. It is not easy to read, not least because its many themes tend to tumble over one another, but it is thought-provoking and challenging. Historians of thirteenth-century England may doubt whether a simple dichotomy between strong and weak kingship can capture the complexity of the relationship between the nobility and the Crown; others may balk at an explanation that is, in the final analysis, monocausal. Despite the many points of contention, this book richly deserves a close reading and a thorough debate about its findings

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