Assessing a Revised Compensation Theodicy

Bibliographic Data

ID3387274
AuthorsBruce R Reichenbach (0000-0002-7183-8359, Augsburg University, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume13
Issue11
Pages1080
Publication date2022-11-09
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligions (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2077-1444 • E-ISSN: 2077-1444
PublisherMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/rel13111080
OpenAlexW4308871340
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited13

Attempts to resolve the problem of evil often appeal to a greater good, according to which God's permission of moral and natural evil is justified because (and just in case) the evil that is permitted is necessary for the realization of some greater good. In the extensive litany of greater good theodicies and defenses, the appeal to the greater good of an afterlife of infinite reward or pleasure has played a minor role in Christian thought but a more important role in Islamic thought. In a recent article, Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad invites us to reconsider the greater good theodicy of compensation. He contends that not only are all evils justified in that God compensates the sufferer in an afterlife, but because the evils experienced produce some good, God has reason for bringing about or allowing evils in the first place. In what follows, I argue that this modified compensation theodicy is flawed in its premises, faces serious problems with its concept of justice, treats people as means only and not as intrinsically valuable, and ultimately fails to show that an afterlife compensation, along with some good produced here and now by evil, justify God bringing about or allowing evil

Afterlife · Appeal · Economic Justice · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Moral evil · Pleasure · Political science · Theodicy · Law · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access