Information Dissemination, Competitive Pressure, and Politician Performance between Elections
A Field Experiment in Uganda
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 3394782 |
|---|---|
| Autores | G Grossman (0000-0002-6980-6390, California University of Pennsylvania, autor correspondente), Kristin Michelitch (0000-0002-5436-7508, Vanderbilt University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2018 |
| Volume | 112 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 280-301 |
| Data de publicação | 2018-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055417000648 |
| OpenAlex | W2791276992 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 50 |
| Referências citadas | 57 |
Politicians shirk when their performance is obscure to constituents. We theorize that when politician performance information is disseminated early in the electoral term, politicians will subsequently improve their performance in anticipation of changes in citizens' evaluative criteria and possible challenger entry in the next election. However, politicians may only respond in constituencies where opposition has previously mounted. We test these predictions in partnership with a Ugandan civil society organization in a multiyear field experiment conducted in 20 district governments between the 2011 and 2016 elections. While the organization published yearly job duty performance scorecards for all incumbents, it disseminated the scorecards to constituents for randomly selected politicians. These dissemination efforts induced politicians to improve performance across a range of measures, butonly in competitive constituencies. Service delivery was unaffected. We conclude that, conditional on electoral pressure, transparency can improve politicians' performance between elections but not outcomes outside of their control
Duty · Economics · General partnership · Incentive · Microeconomics · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Transparency (behavior · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Media Influence and Politics · Public Administration
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| Obras citantes distintas | 50 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 6,25 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 50 |