Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom
Exploring a Glut-Theoretic Account
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3395494 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Devito (0000-0002-8065-1457, University of Birmingham, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 9 |
| Pages | 770 |
| Publication date | 2021-09-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religions (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2077-1444 • E-ISSN: 2077-1444 |
| Publisher | MDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.3390/rel12090770 |
| OpenAlex | W3201649466 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 10 |
This essay marks the first steps towards a viable glut-theoretic (contradictory) solution to the longstanding foreknowledge and free will dilemma. Specifically, I offer a solution to the dilemma that accommodates omniscience (foreknowledge) and human freedom (as the ability to do otherwise) in a simple, flat-footed way. This goal is accomplished via viewing the theological fatalist argument not as a problem, but as a sound argument: omniscience and human free will are contradictory and by dropping to a weaker underlying account of logical consequence, we can embrace them in their full-throated, robust (though contradictory) interpretations. That said, the primary aim of this paper is one of exploration: how does a subclassical solution to the foreknowledge and free will dilemma stack up in comparison to the traditional solutions on offer in the literature. This essay represents the beginning of such an exploration
Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Foreknowledge · Free will · Mathematical economics · Omniscience · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |