Defense Department Spending and "Hawkish" Voting in the House of Representatives

Bibliographic Data

ID3456450
AuthorsBruce A Ray (Northern Illinois University, corresponding author)
Year1981
Volume34
Issue3
Pages438
Publication date1981-09-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Western Political Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0043-4078 • E-ISSN: 2325-8675
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/447222
OpenAlexW4254169702, W2330255180
LanguageEN
Citations received12

C ONGRESSMEN employ many cues when deciding how to cast their votes.' One cue at least as important, if not more important, than most others is the demands, interests, and economic involvements of the representative's own constituents.2 It also has been argued that this relationship exists even when legislators claim their independence from constituents.3 Thus, a representative's vote on a bill with substantial and clear-cut implications for the economic well-being of his constituents virtually may be dictated by his need to please the home-folks: a congressman from Brooklyn would be expected to support federal loan guarantees for New York City, a legislator from a tobacco-producing area would most likely resist an attempt to reduce federal subsidies for that commodity, a representative from Seattle would be a supporter of any military aircraft to be built by the Boeing Corporation, and so on. The beauty of an omnibus rivers and harbors bill, for example, is that a majority of the nation's congressional districts can be given an economic stake in its passage, thereby greatly enhancing its chances of success. The cue of district interests is strong. It can even override a congressman's basic ideological leanings. Former Rep. Robert Leggett (D., CA), for example, has a well-deserved reputation as one of the members of the Armed Services Committee most eager to cut military spending. He did not, however, allow this to interfere with his need for constituency service. He lobbied hard for such local projects as Mare Island Naval Shipyard and Travis Air Force Base, and has been quoted as saying: got to be picky and choosy about what I try to terminate, because if I've got a large submarine with 8,000 people working on it in my district, I'm not about to terminate the contract and put 8,000 people out of work.4 The query of this investigation is how close the connection between district interests and the vote(s) in question must be before a member's position is influenced. A representative with 8,000 constituents employed on a Defense Department contract will almost assuredly vote to continue that project. But will these same 8,000 DOD paychecks have a more far-reaching impact upon the legislator? Will they influence him to support Department

Business · Congressman · Economics · House of Representatives · Independence (probability theory) · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislator · Political science · Politics · Reputation · Subsidy · Voting · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Law · Public Administration

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