The Rise and Fall of the Fact/Value Distinction

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3497019
AutoresIrina Davydova (University of Manchester), W Sharrock (0000-0002-7029-8653, University of Manchester)
Año2003
Volumen51
Número3
Páginas357-375
Fecha de publicación2003-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Sociological Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0038-0261 • E-ISSN: 1467-954X
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-954x.00425
OpenAlexW1908792654
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas13
Referencias citadas15

The paper addresses the problem of the conceptualisation of morality in sociology. The traditional sociological conception of morality was based upon the acceptance of a fact/value dichotomy, implying that sociology portrays the factual nature of morality, which thereby becomes equivalent to group conformity The opposition of fact and value was brought into question by trends of thought that followed from, respectively, Alfred Schutz and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The line from Schutz's ideas led towards their reformulation by Harold Garfinkel, who to large extent integrated the 'moral' with the 'cognitive'. Wittgenstein's influence, through, especially Peter Winch, John W. Cook and Alfred Louch undercut the idea that sociological descriptions were themselves purely factual, rather than integrally evaluative. A third stream is represented by Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, who adopt the idea that morality must be understood in its social and historical context, and explicitly reject the separation of fact and value in moral inquiry. The fact/value distinction is the source of chronic problems for the sociology of morality. Specifically, a sociological account of morality, that would define the correct understanding of the nature of morality - ie identify what substantive character and content is appropriate to it - is not possible. The disintegration of the fact/value dichotomy also means that the idea that the social context can itself be described independently of normative considerations is an illusion

Conformity · Context (archaeology · Epistemology · Morality · Morality and religion · Normative · Opposition (politics · Politics · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Social and Cultural Dynamics · Social Psychology · Sociology and Norbert Elias