Between Timelessness and Historiality
On the Dynamics of the Epistemic Objects of Mathematics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3499393 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Moritz Epple (Goethe University Frankfurt, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 102 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 481-493 |
| Publication date | 2011-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Isis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-1753 • E-ISSN: 1545-6994 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/661622 |
| PMID | 22073772 |
| OpenAlex | W1999713402 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 6 |
In order to discuss the temporal structure of mathematical research, this essay offers four related definitions of a mathematical object from different times and places. It is argued that in order to appreciate the differences between these definitions, the historian needs to understand that none of them made sense in mathematical practice without a technical framework, referred to but not explained in the definitions themselves (an "epistemic configuration of research"); that the dynamics of the epistemic objects of mathematical research are secondary to the dynamics of these epistemic configurations as a whole; and that the dynamics of epistemic configurations of mathematical research do not follow law-like processes. Very different types of change may happen, and some of them link the dynamics of epistemic configurations with events and developments far beyond the bounds of the research field in question. These insights have historiographical consequences that require us to rethink the kind of temporality ascribed to mathematics
Dynamics (music · Epistemology · Field (mathematics · Mathematical practice · Object (grammar · Order (exchange · Pure mathematics · Sociology · Temporality · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · History and Theory of Mathematics · Mathematics · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.18 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2022 (8) |
| Highly cited | No |