Understanding Presidential Power in Argentina
A Study of the Policy of Privatisation in the 1990s
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3507243 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mariana Llanos (0000-0003-2699-8852, University of Augsburg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 67-99 |
| Publication date | 2001-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Latin American Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-216X • E-ISSN: 1469-767X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022216x00005861 |
| OpenAlex | W2144147058 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
This article focuses on the political and institutional process by which the privatisation policy was approved in Argentina during the 1990s. It concentrates mainly on the relationships that the President maintained with Congress and the political parties sitting in it. By looking through the lens of the privatisation case-study, the article aims to analyse the institutional capacity of Argentine democratic presidents to enact policy reforms. The article shows that the Presidency's constitutional resources in combination with the President's strong base of partisan support permitted the adoption of the innovative privatisation policy at an institutional level. However, the article also explains that the political and institutional resources of the Presidency were not invariable and permanent. Rather, the approval of the privatisation policy shows that policy-making processes involve a dialogue between President and Congress, an institutional interchange that can serve either to enhance or to constrain the powers of the President. By showing that congressional intervention should not be underestimated, this article claims that the Argentine presidential regime is better characterised as one of limited centralism than as an example of hyper-presidentialism. The first characterisation not only acknowledges the complexity of the institutional relations, but also the fact that, given a situation of presidential centralism, institutional relations are variable and, most importantly, contingent upon political conditions
Democracy · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Presidency · Presidential system · Law · Political Theory and Democracy · Politics and Society in Latin America · Public Administration · Public Policy and Governance
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Persistent systemic corruption
Privatization in Asia and Latin America
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Politics and Privatization
Institutions and the Legislative Success of ‘Strong’ Presidents
Partisanship, Democracy and the Global Market Economy
Machine Politics and Democracy
With a Little Help from my Friends
Health sector reform in Argentina
Privatização e processo decisório
The World Bank and Policy Reform in Mexico and Argentina
The Political Economy of Policy Volatility in Latin America
A Reform without Losers
Defining Rights in Democratization
| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,91 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2024 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 19 |