The Consequences of Increased Enforcement of Legal Minimum Wages in a Developing Country
An Evaluation of the Impact of the Campaña Nacional de Salarios Mínimos in Costa Rica
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3528467 |
|---|---|
| Authors | T H Gindling, Nadwa Mossaad (0000-0002-1772-1432), Juan Diego Trejos (University of Maryland, Baltimore County) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 666-707 |
| Publication date | 2015-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Industrial and Labor Relations Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0019-7939 • E-ISSN: 2162-271X |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0019793915575703 |
| OpenAlex | W2222726447 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 25 |
In August 2010, the Costa Rican government implemented a comprehensive program to increase compliance with legal minimum wages, the Campaña Nacional de Salarios Mínimos (National Campaign for Minimum Wages). To evaluate the impact of the Campaign, the authors use a regression discontinuity (RD) approach, which compares what happened to workers who before the Campaign had been earning below the minimum wage to those who before the Campaign had been earning above the minimum wage. They analyze a panel data set with information on workers from before the Campaign began (July 2010) and after the Campaign had been in operation for some time (July 2011). The evidence supports the conclusion that the Campaign led to an increase in compliance with minimum wage laws in Costa Rica; the mean earnings of those being paid less than the minimum wage in 2010 increased by approximately 10% more than the earnings of those being paid more than the minimum wage. The Campaign led to the largest increases in the wages of women, younger workers, and less-educated workers. The authors find no evidence that the Campaign had a negative impact on the employment of full-time workers whose wages were increased. Weak evidence suggests that the Campaign had a negative impact on the employment of part-time private-sector employees. Although increased inspections mainly targeted minimum wage violations, the authors also observe an increase in compliance with a broader set of labor standards and a positive spillover effect relative to other violations of labor laws. Specifically, the analysis provides evidence that the Campaign had a positive impact on the probability that workers receive legally mandated nonwage benefits such as Social Security (which includes pension and health insurance), overtime pay, sick leave, and paid vacations
Demographic economics · Earnings · Economics · Enforcement · Government (linguistics) · Hourly wage · Labour economics · Minimum wage · Panel data · Political science · Regression discontinuity design · Spillover effect · Wage · Employment and Welfare Studies · Finance · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Law · Taxation and Compliance Studies
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The Consequences of Legal Minimum Wages in Honduras
Heterogeneous effects of imperfectly enforced minimum wages in low-wage labor markets
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Regional Labour Informality in Colombia and a Proposal for a Differential Minimum Wage
Incentives to Comply with the Minimum Wage in the United States and the United Kingdom
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Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design
Regression discontinuity designs
Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics
Civil Society and the State
The effect of minimum wages on actual wages in formal and informal sectors in Costa Rica
The nature of minimum wages and their effectiveness as a wage floor in Costa Rica, 1976–1991
Complementary Labor Regulation
Turning a Blind Eye
Minimum wages and social policy
Enforcement of labor regulation and firm size
Minimum Wages and Compliance
Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations in Argentina
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |