Conspiracy-Beliefs and Receptivity to Disconfirmatory Information
A Study Using the Bade Task
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3561848 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Neophytos Georgiou (0000-0002-7868-8250, The University of Adelaide), P Delfabbro (0000-0002-0466-5611, The University of Adelaide, corresponding author), Ryan Balzan (0000-0003-2007-4317, Flinders University) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | SAGE Open (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2158-2440 • E-ISSN: 2158-2440 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/21582440211006131 |
| OpenAlex | W3150252140 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 54 |
Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs are thought to be related to a number of individual differences that make certain individuals more prone to this style of reasoning. In this study, we investigate (a) the relationship between CT beliefs and a standardized measure of judgment (the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence task or BADE) and (b) the extent to which BADE scores are related to specific measures of psychopathology, including schizotypy and delusion-proneness, as measured by the Peters et al.'s Delusions Inventory. The BADE is an evidence integration bias and captures the extent to which individuals display a reduced willingness to integrate disconfirmatory evidence. A total of 358 individuals recruited from an online panel completed standardized measures of CT beliefs, measures of psychopathology, and a standardized BADE task. The results showed that CT-prone individuals showed a stronger BADE effect (i.e., biases against confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence and a stronger liberal acceptance of absurd statements) and overall poorer evidence integration. Our results suggest that a reduced tendency to revise beliefs in the face of disconfirmatory evidence may contribute to the maintenance of CT beliefs, despite the availability of extensive counter-evidence
Cognitive psychology · Confirmation bias · Delusion · Optimism · Personality · Psychiatry · Psychopathology · Schizotypy · Clinical Psychology · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
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| Citations per year | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |