Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and Coherent Aggregation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3577880 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Soroush Rafiee Rad (0000-0001-5338-902X, University of Bayreuth, corresponding author), Olivier Roy (0000-0002-9085-5701, University of Bayreuth, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 115 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 629-648 |
| Publication date | 2021-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055420001045 |
| OpenAlex | W3112146733 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 38 |
Rational deliberation helps to avoid cyclic or intransitive group preferences by fostering meta-agreements, which in turn ensures single-peaked profiles. This is the received view, but this paper argues that it should be qualified. On one hand we provide evidence from computational simulations that rational deliberation tends to increase proximity to so-called single-plateaued preferences. This evidence is important to the extent that, as we argue, the idea that rational deliberation fosters the creation of meta-agreement and, in turn, single-peaked profiles does not carry over to single-plateaued ones, and the latter but not the former makes coherent aggregation possible when the participants are allowed to express indifference between options. On the other hand, however, our computational results show, against the received view, that when the participants are strongly biased towards their own opinions, rational deliberation tends to create irrational group preferences, instead of eliminating them. These results are independent of whether the participants reach meta-agreements in the process, and as such they highlight the importance of rational preference change and biases towards one's own opinion in understanding the effects of rational deliberation
Deliberation · Economics · Epistemology · Irrational number · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Preference · Process (computing · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
Formal Models
Policy prioritization in participatory planning
Norms of Public Argumentation and the Ideals of Correctness and Participation
Anchoring as a Structural Bias of Deliberation
Deliberation and the Wisdom of Crowds
(The Impossibility of) Deliberation‐Consistent Social Choice
Research Methods in Deliberative Democracy
Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory
The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy
Beyond Fairness and Deliberation
The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy
Social Choice and Individual Values
Deliberative Democracy
The theory of communicative action
Epistemic Democracy
Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments
The Independence Thesis
Understanding Polarization
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Anchoring in Deliberations
On the elusive notion of meta-agreement
Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy
Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice
Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Cycle? Evidence from 36 Elections
Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy
Disaggregating Deliberation’s Effects
Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy
Pluralistic ignorance and alcohol use on campus
Collective preferences in presidential elections
Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting
| Citations per year | 1.75 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |