How not to sanction
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3720951 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel W Drezner, Daniel Drezner (0000-0001-6347-309X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 98 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1533-1552 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-06 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-5850 • E-ISSN: 1468-2346 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ia/iiac065 |
| OpenAlex | W4313143349 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
In the past century economic sanctions have emerged as a prominent 'off the shelf' tool of diplomacy. This article examines two of the most high-profile failures in the history of economic sanctions: the United Nations sanctions against Iraq between the two Gulf wars, and the Trump administration's re-imposition of sanctions on Iran beginning in 2018. The technology of economic statecraft changed considerably between these two cases, indicating significant policy learning. In both instances, however, the sanctions imposed crippling costs on the target state without any observable concessions. In neither case was the primary goal achieved, and the negative policy externalities were considerable. An autopsy of these failures reveals three cautionary warnings. First, the recipe for sanctions success is not merely a function of the ability to impose costs on the target state. Second, an underappreciated impediment to the successful use of economic statecraft is a failure to articulate clear and consistent demands. Third, tight linkages between scholars and policy-makers can lead to improved policies in the short term, but long-term political imperatives within great powers can pervert such successes
Development economics · Diplomacy · Economic policy · Economic sanctions · Economics · Externality · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sanctions · State (computer science) · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Law · Security, Politics, and Digital Transformation
How citizens update their preferences on foreign policy
Iran’s Foreign Policy Under US Economic Sanctions
The Evolution of Databases in the Age of Targeted Sanctions
Using LLMs for measurement in diplomatic speeches
Tools of the weak? Economic sanctions, threat perception, and conflict escalation
Should They Go, or May They Stay
Who gets picked on and why? The politics of North Korea’s human rights recommendations in the universal periodic review
Is Just War Theory the Appropriate Framework for Assessing the Morality of Economic Sanctions
From geopolitics to geoeconomics and back. Why age of geoeconomics is over
Sanctioning as a goal unto itself
Securitization, frame alignment, and the legitimation of US chip export controls on China
Economic Sanctions and Taxation of Natural Resource Rent
Conditional Humanitarianism
Impact of economic sanctions on net commodity-producing and net commodity-consuming countries
Trends in Political Science Research
The Cornered Mouse
Re-examining the effects of Western sanctions on democracy and human rights in the 21 st century
Does Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Affect Elite Preferences? Evidence from the 2022 US Sanctions against Russia
Global Economic Sanctions
| Citations per year | 4.75 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Highly cited | No |