The Dark Side of Legalism
Abuse of the Law and Democratic Erosion in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 3758755 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Benjamin Garcia Holgado (0000-0002-6768-3366, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA, autor correspondente), Raul A Sanchez-Urribarri (0000-0001-8615-6724, La Trobe University), Raúl Sánchez Urribarri (La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia) |
| Ano | 2024 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Fascículo | 12 |
| Páginas | 1578-1596 |
| Data de publicação | 2024-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | American Behavioral Scientist (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0002-7642 • E-ISSN: 1552-3381 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00027642241268332 |
| OpenAlex | W4401551975 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 7 |
| Referências citadas | 40 |
Why do some elected leaders use legalistic strategies to undermine democracy from within? And under what conditions do they succeed in the use of these strategies? In this article, we argue that the abuse of law is at the center of the toolkit of emerging autocrats. Executives use an ample menu of legal tools and mechanisms (laws, constitutional amendments, executive decrees, administrative resolutions, and regulations by federal agencies) to gradually dismantle each of the components of liberal democracy. We show how the co-optation of the judiciary by the executive helps create an appearance of institutional normalcy that enhances regime legitimacy. In an era of democratic backsliding, executives capture or coerce judiciaries to neutralize opposition threats, carry out their policy agenda, secure and distribute benefits among allies, and dismantle various components that make up liberal democracies. To understand how executives have different levels of success in using multiple legal tools and mechanisms to undermine democracy, we compare three Latin American countries with disparate regime trajectories: Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Our paper situates judicial actors at the center of the legal toolkit of emerging autocrats by studying how (and in what ways) courts become illiberal tools for legal reform and implementation to dismantle liberal democracy gradually. We show how, in these cases, "legal narratives" are used to legitimize the slow undermining of democratic rule
Democracy · Geography · Great Rift · Legalism (Western philosophy) · Political science · Politics · Rule of law · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law in Society and Culture · Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses
Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies
Poland's Constitutional Breakdown
The Concept of Law
Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. Democracy Report 2023
Winds of Change
Court-packing and democratic decay
Anti-Media Discourse and Violence Against Journalists
Venezuelan regional elections, democratic backsliding, and autocratization in the 2010s
The fragility of an independent judiciary
Surveil and Sanction
Justices and Political Loyalties
Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism
Legal gaslighting
Autocracy rising
Forging, Bending, and Breaking
Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift
The Authoritarian Resurgence
A third wave of autocratization is here
Democratic decoupling
The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts
Classifying Ecuador's Regime under Correa
Guarding the Guardians
The 2013 Ecuadorian general elections
Contra-Associational Strategy in a Hybrid Regime
| Obras citantes distintas | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 3,5 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 7 |