"Imperialism" in Bureaucracy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3764005 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Holden, Matthew H Holden (0000-0001-5135-9433, Wayne State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1966 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 943-951 |
| Publication date | 1966-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1953767 |
| OpenAlex | W2154496105 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 39 |
| References cited | 29 |
If an important part of the political scientist's mission is to anticipate and explain "the critical problems that generate turbulence" in that part of the world which attracts his attention, then, in the study of administration, bureaucratic "imperialism" must be of compelling interest. If systematic data directly assembled for the purpose are lacking, and if there are some signal problems of theory which have been little investigated, there is still enough evidence from studies of other political problems that it seems worthwhile to set out some trial-run ideas in the hope that they will elicit further discussion.Bureaucractic imperialism seems pre-eminently a matter of inter-agency conflict in which two or more agencies try to assert permanent control over the same jurisdiction, or in which one agency actually seeks to take over another agency as well as the jurisdiction of that agency. We are thus primarily concerned with the politics of allocation and shall, except incidentally, bypass some other interesting aspects of inter-agency politics such as cooperation between agencies sharing missions, competition for favorable "one-time-only" decisions which do not involve jurisdictional reallocation, or the critical problems of the "holding company" administrative organization and its internal politics. For the moment, our concern with the politics of allocation leads to a focus on what would appear to be the likely behaviors of those decisionmakers who have both inclination and opportunity to look after the institutional well-being of agencies
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Competition (biology · Jurisdiction · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Public Administration
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Imposing Procedural Constraints on State Administrative Agencies
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Nato's persistence after the cold war
Administrators' Beliefs About the Role of the Public
Federal Interagency Action and Inaction
Political Insulation, Information Exchange, and Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy
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Accidents, Scandals, and Political Support for Regulatory Agencies
Whither Power in Public Administration? Attainment, Dissipation, and Loss
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| Unique citing works | 39 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,72 |
| Citation span | 1972 - 2023 (52) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 38 |