Richard Rorty, Liberalism and the Politics of Redescription

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3764040
AutoresKeith Topper (0000-0003-2134-2424, California State University, Long Beach, autor de correspondencia)
Año1995
Volumen89
Número4
Páginas954-965
Fecha de publicación1995-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2082520
OpenAlexW1969335438
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10
Referencias citadas16

In recent years Richard Rorty has sought to develop an alternative to the familiar rationalist and natural rights "vocabularies" of liberalism. Unlike most critics of classical liberalism, however, Rorty eschews attempts toargueagainst these vocabularies, and instead seeks to persuade his readers byredescribingthe aspirations of a liberal society in a more "attractive" way. I assess Rorty's redescriptive practice through an analysis of his ideal liberal polity. I contend that although Rorty defends redescription as an alternative to "normal" philosophical and theoretical argument, his redescriptive efforts fail on their own terms: not only does it appear that there is no redescription in his descriptions, but he proves incapable of offering any insights into or exits from pressing problems in contemporary liberal societies. This, I submit, can be traced back to his unwillingness to investigate and redescribe power and power relations

Argument (complex analysis · Classical liberalism · Epistemology · Ideal (ethics · Law and economics · Liberalism · Political science · Politics · Polity · Power (physics · Sociology · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications