Meritocracy as Authoritarian Co-Optation

Political Selection and Upward Mobility in China

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3765342
AutoresHanzhang Liu (0000-0003-1003-1372, Pitzer College, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen118
Número4
Páginas1856-1872
Fecha de publicación2024-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s000305542300120x
OpenAlexW4390272944
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas16
Referencias citadas55

Why does an authoritarian regime adopt meritocracy in its political selection? I argue that meritocracy can be used to co-opt large numbers of ordinary citizens by providing them with an opportunity of socioeconomic advancement instead of income redistribution, as long as the selection process is viewed as inclusive and rule-based. Focusing on the civil service examination in contemporary China, I examine how this meritocratic selection has shaped the relationship between college graduates and the Chinese regime. Exploiting a spatial-cohort variation in applicant eligibility, I find that the exam boosts college graduates' perceived upward mobility, which in turn weakens their demand for redistribution even in the face of growing inequality. These findings point to an alternative mode of authoritarian co-optation and highlight the role of upward mobility in regime stability

Authoritarianism · China · Democracy · Demographic economics · Economics · Impartiality · Inequality · Meritocracy · Political science · Politics · Redistribution (election · Social mobility · Socioeconomic status · Sociology · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Demographic Trends and Gender Preferences · Demography · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies