Philosophical Ethology and Animal Subjectivity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3774147 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Roberto Marchesini (0009-0001-4223-0555, c/o Apeiron Editoria e Comunicazione/Golfetto, Via Vinicio Pescerelli 78 (primo piano), 40018 San Pietro in Casale, Bologna, ItalyE-mail) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 237-252 |
| Publication date | 2016-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Angelaki (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0969-725X • E-ISSN: 1469-2899 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0969725x.2016.1163859 |
| OpenAlex | W2338531072 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 4 |
Philosophical ethology draws heavily upon the methods and findings of ethological traditions but must be a properly philosophical undertaking that reframes them in terms of critical and speculative questions about animal mind and animal subjectivity. Both traditional ethology and later cognitive ethology failed to call into question the dualistic Cartesian ontological paradigm that introduced and justified an unbridgeable divide between human and nonhuman animals. Following the implications of Darwinian evolution and immanentist ontological philosophy, philosophical ethology presents a model of animal subjectivity and desire that encompasses nonhuman and human animals. Martin Heidegger was correct in his phenomenological description of being-in-the-world, but he erred badly in failing to extend this model to other animals. Relationships to temporality and desire indicate that subjectivity is widespread among animals
Biology · Cognitive science · Darwinism · Epistemology · Ethology · Subjectivity · Temporality · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Psychology · Ecology · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,2 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2022 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |