Institutional Design, Military Rule, and Regime Transition in Argentina (1976-1983)

An Extension of the Remmer Thesis1

Bibliographic Data

ID3818003
AuthorsCraig L Arceneaux (University of California, Riverside, corresponding author)
Year1997
Volume16
Issue3
Pages327-350
Publication date1997-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBulletin of Latin American Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0261-3050 • E-ISSN: 1470-9856
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1470-9856.1997.tb00057.x
OpenAlexW4206310667
LanguageEN
References cited11

In this essay, I argue that institutions in military regimes have a significant impact not only on regime durability, but also on the level of control the military is likely to exert when it withdraws from rule. Borrowing from a typology of military regimes developed by Karen Remmer, I note how the feudal regime engenders a level of investment that drives it to remain in office despite the inability of this institutional arrangement to contain politicisation in the armed forces. The obstinacy of the feudal regime thus inevitably leads it toward collapse. The argument is tested with a detailed case study of the Proceso regime in Argentina

Argument (complex analysis · Economic system · Economics · Extension (predicate logic · Feudalism · Investment (military · Law and economics · Military rule · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Regime change · Sociology · Transition (genetics · Typology · Law · Political and Social Dynamics in Chile and Latin America · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America

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