On Knowledge and the Diversity of Cultures

On Knowledge and the Diversity of Cultures: Comment on Harding Shigehisa Kuriyama (bio) The central theme of Sandra Harding’s essay can be expressed in more than one way. Harding’s own formulation highlights the notion of multiculturalism. Her title asks, Is science multicultural? and the essay answers, unequivocally: Yes. But it is possible—and I think preferable—to recast her concerns in slightly different terms. Instead of lingering on the opposition of the universal and the multicultural, we might reintepret her argument as one focused above all on the assertion of comparability. One advantage of this alternative is that it is more precise. The term “multicultural” is notoriously vague: it sweeps under its blanket generality a tangle of confusions and uncertainties about how cultures can or should relate to each other, and how their worldviews relate to the world. “Comparability” identifies more exactly the crux of Harding’s argument. At issue is the relationship between modern Western science and traditions of knowledge found elsewhere. In one view, an unbridgeable chasm separates the two. There can, in this view, be no comparative studies of science, because only Western science is the real thing. Outside the West, one may find superstitions, folk wisdom, belief systems, even great religions, but not (indigenously) the hard, objective, systematic grasp of how the world really is. Not true science. Harding’s three arguments against this view form the core of her essay. She urges, first, that what is called Western science incorporates significant elements from non-Western cultures; second, that [End Page 337] there are knowledge traditions outside the West that have legitimate claims to be considered sciences; and third, that Western science, no less than knowledge elsewhere, is enmeshed in a dense network of broader cultural values and assumptions. The heart of her critique, in other words, is a critique of the assumption of radical difference. It is an argument for comparability. At stake, of course, are not just perceptions of similarity and otherness, but judgments of superiority and inferiority, struggles for dignity and power—and these judgments and struggles rank, quite properly, among Harding’s foremost concerns. But here again, “comparability” captures the gist of the matter: it evokes in its very etymology the primacy of parity, the quest for a way of imagining cultures that asserts equality while recognizing difference. As I read her, this is the cornerstone of Harding’s conception of the multicultural. Hers is a pluralistic vision of knowledge in which modern Western science represents, not the absolute, universal standard, but just one way—among many possible ways—of engaging the world. Is Harding right? Should we speak of multiple scientific traditions? Or is modern Western science incomparably unique? A second advantage to casting the debate in terms of comparability is that it makes clear how this choice really is not a choice at all. The question of whether or not two things can be compared has no fixed answer: it depends on the grounds of comparison. We cannot compare cakes and cars in terms of taste or the smoothness of the ride, but we can compare their color, their weight, the time required to make them. In some contexts, taste may be what matters most; in others, time may be of the essence. This brings me to what I see as the chief weakness in Harding’s stance: she asserts comparability without actually comparing—without trying, even, to specify the grounds of comparison. Her vision of multiculturalism is abstract, theoretical, and general. She casts doubts on received assumptions of difference, and she confidently urges the possibility of sciences other than modern Western science; but she offers no details about how we might recognize such alternative sciences, about what might mark them as sciences. Now this may seem a churlish complaint. Some may deem it enough that Harding takes the bold first step of declaring comparability, of challenging smug Western claims to know best. The next step—that of elaborating exactly how different cultural traditions compare, of actually situating them on a revised global map of sciences—would presumably require longer studies of a different kind, [End Page 338] in-depth analyses of particular examples. Harding’s short essay

Argument (complex analysis · Assertion · Comparability · Conceptualism · Diversity (politics · Epistemology · Generality · Multiculturalism · Sociology · Theme (computing · Anthropology · Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology

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