Pax Americana

The United States, the Palestinians, and the Peace Process, 1948-2008

Bibliographic Data

ID3874291
AuthorsOsamah Khalil, Osamah F Khalil (corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume8
Issue2
Pages1-41
Publication date2008-09-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCR The New Centennial Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1532-687X • E-ISSN: 1539-6630
PublisherProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1353/ncr.0.0026
OpenAlexW2087706946
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited15

Pax Americana:The United States, the Palestinians, and the Peace Process, 1948–2008 Osamah Khalil (bio) The sixtieth anniversary of theNakba offers a somber but appropriate moment for Palestinians to reflect on the state of their struggle for self-determination. The past 60 years have witnessed the emergence of the United States as the sole global superpower and hegemon in the Middle East, as well as the collapse and rebirth of the Palestinian national movement. These two developments have intersected at various points since 1948 and culminated in the November 2007 Annapolis conference, where the United States openly declared its support for the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Yet, as this paper will demonstrate, Washington’s slow recognition during this time that the Palestinians occupied a central place within the Arab-Israeli conflict corresponded with the Palestinian leadership’s steady abandonment of Palestinian rights and concomitant erosion of their negotiating position. Thus, although the declared goal of the revived peace [End Page 1] process is a Palestinian state, the parameters of that state will not be one the vast majority of Palestinians can accept, nor will it truly be independent, contiguous, and viable. Nor will the other outstanding issues, particularly the right of return of Palestinian refugees and sovereignty over Jerusalem’s holy sites, be resolved in a manner that fulfills Palestinian rights and aspirations. This paper will demonstrate that the Palestinian movement was most successful when it was united with effective institutions. It will argue that only by reclaiming their national movement and transforming it into a united and truly representative body can Palestinians hope to achieve their goals. Imposing a Solution The initial phase of the peace process was characterized by American attempts to impose a solution on the Palestine conflict without the consent or participation of the Palestinians. Prior to May 15, 1948, Washington’s approach to the Palestine Question was torn between ideological support for Zionism, particularly in the White House and Congress, and the political pragmatism of the State Department, which attempted to balance the claims of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab states with those of the Zionist movement and British policies in Palestine. Although the United States supported UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 181, which called for partitioning Palestine into two states, the State Department was concerned about the inability to enforce the resolution short of war. As a result, it began investigating the creation of a UN-mandated trusteeship for Palestine, including consultations with the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) and the Jewish Agency although neither favored the proposal. However, the collapse of Palestinian resistance and the end of the British mandate by May 14, as well as opposition from the White House and Britain, effectively ended these efforts.1 Washington’s recognition of Israel coupled with the ensuing 1948 Palestine War altered the contours of the Palestine conflict. Recognition of Israel, although opposed by some State Department officials, was the fulfillment of American sympathies with the Zionist movement that began with President Woodrow Wilson’s private support of the Balfour Declaration. From Washington’s perspective, the ensuing invasion by neighboring Arab armies [End Page 2] changed the conflict from one between two competing national claims to a regional war in an area considered vital to U.S. interests. After the war, the United States believed Israel was a reality that the Arab states would eventually be forced to accept. Achieving acceptance of Israel and stability in the region were pursued on two separate but related tracks. Beginning in January 1949, public, bilateral negotiations between Israel and the front-line combatant Arab states were held in Rhodes, Greece. By the end of July, Israel reached separate armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria, shaping the region’s borders until 1967. In an attempt to translate the armistice agreements into a final peace, follow-up talks began in Lausanne, Switzerland, in April under the auspices of the UN-mandated Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC). On a separate and private track, talks between King Abdullah of Transjordan and Israel were held (Shlaim 1988, 386, 392–98, 469–76).2 Representatives of the Palestinian people, including the AHC, were not invited to these talks. However

Arab–Israeli conflict · Hegemony · Middle East · Negotiation · Palestinian refugees · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Refugee · Sociology · Sovereignty · Superpower · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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