Justification, Deductive Closure and Reasons to Believe
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3888063 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Audi (0000-0001-9192-0256, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 1-2 |
| Pages | 77-84 |
| Publication date | 1991-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300013330 |
| OpenAlex | W2063765475 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
By deduction, we often extend both our knowledge and our justified belief. Moreover, in achieving knowledge or justified belief of some proposition, we commonly acquire justification for believing many of its entailed consequences, such as at least some of those that self-evidently follow from it. These and related facts have led some philosophers to endorse strong closure principles, for instance: If a person, S, is justified in believing a proposition, p, and p entails q, then S is justified in believing q. Others have denied such principles, whether for justification or, with the appropriate additions, for knowledge. The debate continues. There is, however, this much consensus: there are difficult problems about the scope of closure, and epistemology should develop theories that can resolve them
Closure (psychology) · Epistemology · Political science · Proposition · Scope (computer science) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,03 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 1991 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |