Hume's Defence of Science
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3889008 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fred Wilson |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 611-628 |
| Publication date | 1986-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300049568 |
| OpenAlex | W2100595182 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 14 |
It is incorrect to construe Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. Or so I have argued elsewhere. To the contrary, Hume in fact offers a detailed defence of the thesis that the norms of scientific inference, that is, the "rules by which to judge of causes and effects", arereasonablerules to follow in forming our beliefs. Conforming to these rules in its formation of causal beliefs is astrategythe understanding employs in order to satisfy the end of curiosity (T271). Science is reasonable because, so far as we can, within our fallible limits, discover, it is the strategy of belief formation that is the best means of achieving our end of truth, insofar as the latter is, within our fallible limits, attainable
Curiosity · Economics · Epistemology · Inference · Order (exchange · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Philosophy · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 1988 - 1996 (9) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |