On How (Not) to Argue for Preferring God's Non-Existence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3889149 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kirk Lougheed (0000-0001-5844-2870, McMaster University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 677-699 |
| Publication date | 2019-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217318000574 |
| OpenAlex | W2899043333 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 26 |
Consider two epistemically possible worlds that are as similar as can be, except that atheism is true in one world and theism is true in the other world. Which world is it rational to prefer? I explore the strongest defence of the somewhat counterintuitive claim that it is rational to prefer the atheistic world. I also discuss the opposite conclusion, namely, that it's rational to prefer the theistic world. Surprisingly, my conclusion is that it's difficult to tell whether to prefer theism or atheism overall
Agnosticism · Atheism · Counterintuitive · Epistemology · Theism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2024 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |