Hume's Argument for the Superiority of Natural Instinct
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3889357 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Barbara Winters (University of California San Diego, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1981 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 635-643 |
| Publication date | 1981-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300021387 |
| OpenAlex | W2118215566 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 1 |
In book I of the Treatise Hume argues that we have no reason to believe what we do about matters of fact (139, 265); these beliefs are not "just conclusions" (89), nor are they "built on solid reasoning" (90). Therefore, all such beliefs are equally unjustified no matter how they are acquired. One might suppose, then, that he would hold that no ranking of ways of acquiring beliefs is possible; all are on a par, since all the resulting beliefs are unreasonable
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Instinct · Natural (archaeology) · Ranking (information retrieval) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Ecology · History · Hume's philosophy and hair distribution · Medicine · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.04 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2001 - 2001 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |