Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel'sPhenomenology of Spirit

Bibliographic Data

ID3890002
AuthorsKenneth R Westphal (0000-0001-6039-760X, University of Kent, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume48
Issue4
Pages753-799
Publication date2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217309990412
OpenAlexW2131012668
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited70

Individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification in cognition or morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. I argue for this by defending key themes from Kant's and Hegel's accounts of rational judgment and justification, including the "autonomy" of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel's account of "mutual recognition." These themes are rooted in Kant's and Hegel's transformation of the modern natural law tradition, which originates the properly pragmatic account of rationality, which affords genuine rational justification, and which provides for realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about moral norms

Autonomy · Epistemology · Hegelianism · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Objectivity (philosophy) · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Political science · Practical reason · Rationality · Realism · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · War, Ethics, and Justification