The Infinite and the Indeterminate in Spinoza
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3890004 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Shannon Dea (0000-0002-4535-5441, University of Waterloo, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 603-621 |
| Publication date | 2011-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217311000564 |
| OpenAlex | W2144939262 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 12 |
I argue that when Spinoza describes substance and its attributes as "infinite," he means that they are utterly indeterminate. That is, his conception of infinitude is not a mathematical one. For Spinoza, anything truly infinite eludes counting - not because it is so large as to be uncountable, but because it is just not the kind of thing that can be enumerated or measured. Contra the contemporary mathematical conception of the infinite, I argue that Spinoza's conception is closer to a grammatical one. I conclude by considering a number of arguments against this account of the Spinozan infinite as indeterminate
Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · Indeterminate · Pure mathematics · Uncountable set · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2025 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |