Wright's Enquiry Concerning Humean Understanding
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3890286 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fred Wilson (University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 747-752 |
| Publication date | 1986-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300049659 |
| OpenAlex | W2157177034 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 10 |
From the time of Reid through Coleridge to T. H. Green, Hume was interpreted as a sceptic and as a wholly negative philosopher. And from their perspective such an interpretation no doubt makes some sense, given the vested interest in religion and the absolute of the idealists: from that perspective it is an essential part of a positive position that it take one beyond the realm of ordinary objects known by sense experience to a realm of entities that transcend that world of everyday life. That interpretation lingers on, like bad jokes, to retail in Philosophy 100 classes. On the other hand, in an age where the demand that one have access to a transcendent entity is less insistent, it has become possible to challenge the orthodox reading of Hume. The first to do this was Norman Kemp Smith, who argued that, while Hume was a sceptic, he in fact also had a positive view, not to be sure that of Reid & Co., but that of anaturalist, that is, one who holds that our beliefs, and our moral commitments, are none of them rational, none of them products of reason, but rather are products of our instinctive and passionate natures. This interpretation continues to have important defenders such as Popkin and Stroud. More recently, however, some scholars have gone further and argued that there are good senses in which Hume is not a sceptic, and that he constructs a case that our instinctual beliefs are not only natural but also rational. Major works defending this reading of Hume as a naturalized epistemologist are those of Livingston and Jones. The Kemp Smith interpretation has, however, found a major new defender in John Wright'sThe Sceptical Realism of David Hume
Absolute (philosophy) · Epistemology · Instinct · Interpretation (philosophy) · Natural (archaeology) · Naturalism · Perspective (graphical) · Rationality · Reading (process) · Realm · Skepticism · Wright · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,03 |
| Citation span | 1987 - 1987 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |