A Seeming Problem for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3890347 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John M Mulder (0000-0002-8142-2533, Utrecht University, corresponding author), Jesse M Mulder |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 449-465 |
| Publication date | 2016-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217316000597 |
| OpenAlex | W2531262383 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 17 |
Higher-order theories account for intransitive consciousness by using the transitive notion 'awareness-of.' I argue that this notion implies a form of 'seeming' that the higher-order approach requires, yet cannot account for. I show that, if the relevant kind of seeming is declared to be present in all representational states, the seeming in question is objectionably trivialized; while using the higher-order strategy to capture not only intransitive consciousness but also the relevant kind of seeming results in an infinite regress. Finally, highlighting distinctive features of representations that explain why they display seeming amounts to abandoning the higher-order approach altogether
Consciousness · Epistemology · Order (exchange) · Transitive relation · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,11 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |