Kane and Double on the Principle of Rational Explanation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3890404 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Neil Campbell (0000-0003-2313-6608, Wilfrid Laurier University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 45-63 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217316000779 |
| OpenAlex | W2572673870 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 22 |
Using Jaegwon Kim's framework of explanatory realism versus explanatory irrealism, in addition to some observations about the metaphysics and epistemology of explanation, I re-examine the disagreement between Robert Kane and Richard Double over the principle of rational explanation. I defend Kane's account of dual rationality and argue that Double's principle has a narrower range of application than he claims. I also show that, contrary to what Double assumes, Kane's approach to action explanation does not lapse into a form of explanatory irrealism
Action (physics) · Dual (grammatical number) · Epistemology · Explanatory power · Metaphysics · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Range (aeronautics) · Rationality · Realism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Patterns of discovery.
Human inference
Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence
Patterns of Discovery
Aspects of Scientific Explanation
The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism
Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Relevance
Explanatory Exclusion and the Individuation of Explanations
Oblique causation and reasons for action
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |