Stopping the legal flow of weapons

Compliance with arms embargoes, 1981-2004

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3917138
AutoresJennifer L Erickson (0000-0001-8734-1948, Boston College, autor de correspondencia)
Año2013
Volumen50
Número2
Páginas159-174
Fecha de publicación2013-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
EditorialSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022343312470472
OpenAlexW2126052269
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas16
Referencias citadas52

This article examines sending state compliance with arms embargoes. Arms embargoes are one of the most frequently used types of economic sanctions but they are perceived as one of the least effective. One major problem with arms embargoes, many argue, is sending states' failure to implement them. Yet studies tend to focus on cases of arms embargo violations, not compliance in the context of arms export practice more broadly. Using a series of new arms embargo variables, I conduct a statistical analysis of the relationship between arms embargoes and small and major conventional arms transfers from 1981 to 2004. Contrary to popular expectations, I find that arms embargoes on average restrain sending states' arms exports. If arms embargoes do indeed have difficulty changing targets' behavior, or achieving other measures of 'success', additional explanations must also be considered. I suggest that arms embargo target selection and the intractable challenge of cutting off illicit arms flows are two important plausible alternatives. This finding also provides optimism for compliance with international commitments in the absence of institutionalized enforcement mechanisms. Major exporters overall appear to implement sanctions, despite strong economic incentives to ignore them and a lack of formal accountability mechanisms to punish violators

Arms control · Compliance (psychology) · Computer security · Context (archaeology) · Development economics · Economic sanctions · Economics · Enforcement · Environmental health · Incentive · International trade · Market economy · Nuclear weapon · Poison control · Political science · Sanctions · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Law · Medicine · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology