On Bounded Rationality and the Framing of Decisions in International Relations
Towards a Dynamic Network Model of World Politics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3917302 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jan Faber (Utrecht University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 307-319 |
| Publication date | 1990-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343390027003006 |
| OpenAlex | W2081862388 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 19 |
This article reflects the feedback of empirical research on theorizing about international relations. The empirical results obtained by both Faber (1987a) and Houweling & Siccama (1988) can be explained by the theory of risky prospects developed by Tversky & Kahneman (1981). As this theory is easily integrated into Simon's concept of bounded rationality in human decision-taking, a theoretical framework for the explanation of international relations based on the resulting theoretical notions concerning human decision-taking is developed. Accordingly, decision-taking by governments concerning international relations is conceived to be steered by their bounded rationality with respect to their behavioural options and interaction opportunities and the goal of minimizing losses in their relative power positions with respect to foreign as well as domestic contenders. Because military power capabilities are not equally distributed across the member-states of the international system, the relative power positions of nations result in group-formation among them due to either actual domination or fear of domination. The dynamics of group-interactions is argued to give rise to global stability in international relations. When the power position of a nation deteriorates and the dynamics of group-interactions is absent the probability of an outbreak of war rises sharply
Bounded function · Bounded rationality · Economics · Empirical research · Epistemology · Framing (construction) · International relations · International relations theory · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Prospect theory · Rationality · Sociology · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Engineering · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Psychology · Social Psychology
The theory of political coalitions.
Reason in Human Affairs
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
After Hegemony
The domestic‐international conflict nexus
Windows of Opportunity
The General Validity of the Law of Comparative Advantage
Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War
Dimensions of conflict behavior within and between nations, 1958-60
Measuring Cooperation, Conflict, and the Social Network of Nations
The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (Copdab) Project
Overwhelming Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition Among Contiguous Asian Dyads, 1950–1969
Power Transitions as a Cause of War
Hierarchy versus inertial cooperation
Diffusion of War
Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice
Human Nature in Politics
Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,22 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2025 (18) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |