Windows of repression

Using Covid-19 policies against political dissidents

Bibliographic Data

ID3917352
AuthorsJoan Barceló (0000-0001-6965-4342, New York University Abu Dhabi), Robert Kubinec (0000-0001-6655-4119, New York University Abu Dhabi), Cindy Cheng (0000-0002-7345-827X, Hochschule für Politik at the Technical University of Munich (TUM) and the TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology), Tiril Høye Rahn (Division of Social Sciences, New York University - Abu Dhabi; University of Oxford), Luca Messerschmidt (0000-0001-8069-381X, Hochschule für Politik at the Technical University of Munich (TUM) and the TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology)
Year2022
Volume59
Issue1
Pages73-89
Publication date2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00223433211062389
OpenAlexW4226427654
LanguageEN
Citations received25
References cited51

What explains the great variation in the adoption, timing, and duration of government policies made in response to the COVID-19 pandemic? In this article, we explore whether government incentives to repress domestic dissidents influence their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that COVID-19 containment policies are observationally equivalent to those that abusive governments use to limit domestic dissent - that is, policies that restrict citizens' freedom of movement. This creates an opportunity for abusive governments to engage in repressive behavior without countervailing pressure from citizens and the international community. Following this logic, we expect abusive governments to be more likely to adopt restrictive policies, adopt them earlier in the course of the pandemic, and take longer to relax restrictions. Empirically, we find that governments that have recently engaged in state violence against civilians or abused citizens' human rights were about 10% more likely to enact lockdown and curfew policies. Compared to less repressive countries, these policies were implemented approximately 48 days earlier in the pandemic and kept in place for approximately 23 days longer. Overall, our results advance our understanding of how the repressiveness of state institutions can shape policy responses to a global health crisis

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) · Curfew · Dissent · Economics · Environmental health · Government (linguistics) · Incentive · Market economy · Pandemic · Poison control · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science) · Bangladesh Politics, Society, and Development · Law · Medicine · Political Conflict and Governance · Populism, Right-Wing Movements

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