Transnational terrorism and restrictive immigration policies

Bibliographic Data

ID3918602
AuthorsMarc Helbling (0000-0002-9672-4569, WZB Berlin Social Science Center & University of Bamberg), Daniel Meierrieks (0000-0003-2058-8385, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume57
Issue4
Pages564-580
Publication date2020-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022343319897105
OpenAlexW3020467598
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited29

We investigate the relationship between transnational terrorism and the restrictiveness of immigration policies. We argue that transnational terrorism may create incentives for governments to implement more restrictive migration policies. First, more restrictive policies may make terrorism a more costly endeavor, discouraging future terrorist activity. Second, voters may hold the government accountable for the increased insecurity and economic instability terrorism produces; more restrictive migration policies may signal political resolve and meet public demand for security-providing policies, consequently reducing the government's chances of electoral defeat. We provide an empirical analysis of the effect of transnational terrorism on migration policy restrictiveness for a sample of 30 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010. We find that a greater exposure to transnational terrorism is associated with stricter migration controls, but not stricter migration regulations regarding eligibility criteria and conditions. This finding is robust to different model specifications, estimation methods, operationalizations of terrorism, and instrumental-variable approaches. It points to the securitization of immigration, providing partial support for the notion that transnational terrorism incentivizes migration policy change towards greater restrictiveness. However, the policy response appears to be surgical (affecting only migration controls) rather than sweeping (and thus not influencing broader migration regulations) for the countries in our sample

Development economics · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Immigration · Incentive · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Restrictiveness · Sample (material) · Terrorism · Law · Migration, Health and Trauma · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

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