Deconstructive vs Pragmatic

A Critique of the Derrida-Searle Debate

Datos Bibliográficos

ID3969989
AutoresPeter Bornedal (Departments of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, American University of Beirut, Bliss Street, Ras Beirut 1107-2020, Beirut, Lebanon, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen25
Número1
Páginas62-81
Fecha de publicación2020-01-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe European Legacy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1084-8770 • E-ISSN: 1470-1316
EditorialInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10848770.2019.1652039
OpenAlexW2969996877
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas32

This article presents a critical account of the debate between Derrida and Searle in which I defend Austin’s and Searle’s pragmatic analysis of speech against Derrida’s complex deconstructionist approach. I first formalize Derrida’s argument, reducing it to its main tenets that can be positively identified and critically reviewed. On the basis of this formalization I argue that the apparent incompatibility between Derrida’s and Searle’s approach to language becomes clear once we formalize, according to their type and content, the three concepts of “intention” that are confusedly referred to under one and the same label in the debate. This formalization reduces and clarifies the obscurity associated with the Derrida–Searle debate, and helps demonstrating the shortcomings of Derrida’s position

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications