Deconstructive vs Pragmatic

A Critique of the Derrida-Searle Debate

Bibliographic Data

ID3969989
AuthorsPeter Bornedal (Departments of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, American University of Beirut, Bliss Street, Ras Beirut 1107-2020, Beirut, Lebanon, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume25
Issue1
Pages62-81
Publication date2020-01-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe European Legacy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1084-8770 • E-ISSN: 1470-1316
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10848770.2019.1652039
OpenAlexW2969996877
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited32

This article presents a critical account of the debate between Derrida and Searle in which I defend Austin’s and Searle’s pragmatic analysis of speech against Derrida’s complex deconstructionist approach. I first formalize Derrida’s argument, reducing it to its main tenets that can be positively identified and critically reviewed. On the basis of this formalization I argue that the apparent incompatibility between Derrida’s and Searle’s approach to language becomes clear once we formalize, according to their type and content, the three concepts of “intention” that are confusedly referred to under one and the same label in the debate. This formalization reduces and clarifies the obscurity associated with the Derrida–Searle debate, and helps demonstrating the shortcomings of Derrida’s position

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications