Laws, Darkness, and Resurrection
Exceptions and Violations in Hume's Account of Miracles
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3970132 |
|---|---|
| Authors | C M Lorkowski (Bowling Green State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 7-8 |
| Pages | 732-747 |
| Publication date | 2024-11-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The European Legacy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1084-8770 • E-ISSN: 1470-1316 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10848770.2024.2385742 |
| OpenAlex | W4401255495 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
In this article, I show that David Hume’s argument of Section 10 of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding does not encourage dogmatism. Instead, it suggests a program for how to categorically deny the existence of miracles without bringing about the stagnation of science. In recognizing the entailments of Hume’s notion of proof while realizing his commitments regarding the laws of nature, we must acknowledge that miracles are possible. Yet this is consistent with Hume’s claim that we are never justified in believing the testimony affirming them. This conclusion is strengthened when we realize that only a doxastic notion of lawlikeness is at work in Hume’s argument rather than a robust, efficacious notion of metaphysical laws. When properly understood, we see that the course he advocates does not impede the advances of science, as has sometimes been suggested. Instead, Hume’s deliberate use of specific examples of two very different sorts propounds a procedure for dealing with purported miracles that is much richer than merely denying them, and tells us when revisions to our conception of the laws of nature are necessary and when they are not
Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Natural law · Political science · Evolution and Science Education · Historical Philosophy and Science · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |