Socrates and the critique of metaphysics

Contemporary appropriations of the “end of philosophy” and “end of metaphysics” usually draw no distinction between these two terms. Neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger distinguished between Socrates and Plato with respect to the origin of philosophy and metaphysics. My argument leans on Gregory Vlastos to draw a sharp distinction between Socrates and Plato based upon his account of “the Socratic elenchus.” In the first place, I argue that the critique of metaphysics refers to the legacy stemming from Plato's middle period and, since it does not apply to Socrates, does not apply to philosophy outright. However, this argument might provoke the rejoinder that the only logical and coherent development of Socrates' thought is into Plato's. If this were so, then my argument would be without effect for the practice of philosophy even though it would apply to the thought of Socrates as a historical individual. In this way, the identity of philosophy and metaphysics might again be established. Thus, in the second place, I criticize Vlastos' assertion that method constitutes the specific difference between Socrates and Plato suggesting that “fidelity to instances” defines the practice of inquiry of Socrates. Thus, a continuation of Socrates' inquiry in which this fidelity to instances is central to philosophy would not be in the direction of Plato and would not succumb to Nietzsche's and Heidegger's critique of metaphysics

Epistemology · Metaphysics · SOCRATES · Socratic method · Techne · Chemistry · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Philosophy · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

• The Dissolution of the Problem of the Elenchus

  Hugh H Benson•Oxford studies in ancient…•1995

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