Socrates, Democracy, and the End of History
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3972038 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ann Ward (0000-0001-6010-2816, Baylor University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 7-8 |
| Pages | 695-709 |
| Publication date | 2019-11-17 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The European Legacy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1084-8770 • E-ISSN: 1470-1316 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10848770.2019.1641313 |
| OpenAlex | W2964664425 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
This article explores the importance of the Socratic turn to Hegel’s conception of reason in the Philosophy of History. In the “Introduction” to his work, Hegel initially argues that Socrates advanced beyond Anaxagoras, attempting to connect universal reason to concrete human particulars by means of his theory of ideas or forms. Socrates thus turns from the study of material nature to the rational human soul as it is drawn to the good. In addition, Socrates believed that provided one philosophized, one could grasp the ideas in any place at any time. Hegel himself, however, must advance beyond Socrates because the latter failed to understand that the universal manifested itself slowly in successive stages in the historical process, only becoming fully actualized at the end of history. Philosophy, therefore, is only possible in modernity. Moreover, universal reason takes concrete form, according to Hegel, in the modern liberal state, and an individual, having his or her end in this state, achieves her highest potential by obeying and thereby internalizing the state’s laws. For Hegel, I argue, Socratic philosophy—which questions the laws and authoritative opinions of the political community on behalf of gods or ideas that are higher or independent of it—having no grounds in liberal modernity must come to an end. Yet, when we turn to analyzing Hegel’s suggestion near the end of the “Introduction” that Socrates is a philosophic World-historical individual—a type of individual who undermines his or her society to bring forth a new order—we can see that Hegel nonetheless considers Socrates as possessing greatness. I conclude by turning to John Stuart Mill’s portrayal in On Liberty of Socratic philosophy. I argue that for Mill Socratic philosophy should not cease, as Hegel implies, but rather that it is crucial to ensure the flourishing of freedom in the modern, liberal democratic order. Mill’s conception of Socratic philosophy, I argue, is a model of the individualism and free expression that Mill advocates and that we have come to associate with liberal democratic practice today
Democracy · End of history · Epistemology · Political science · Politics · SOCRATES · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Political Theory and Influence · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
| Highly cited | No |
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