Practical Reasonableness, Theory, and the Science of Self-Understanding

The practical nature of all human understanding lies at the heart of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, yet the stress he places on practicality and his appeal to Aristotle remain relatively neglected by the secondary literature. This neglect is due in part to a failure to see the great extent to which Gadamer relies on the Aristotelian concept of phronēsis (practical wisdom) and, to a lesser extent, on the Hegelian concept of the concrete universal. The purpose of this paper is to show how the proper understanding of Aristotle's notions of practical wisdom and theoretical knowing, both of which are crucial to an appreciation of Gadamer's description of human understanding as Spiel (“game” or “play”), will help to reverse two of the recurring mischaracterizations of philosophical hermeneutics: first, that it is ultimately anti-science (against method and theory) and second, that critical reason or rationality plays only a minor role within it

Appeal · Epistemology · Hegelianism · Hermeneutics · Human science · Neglect · Political science · Rationality · Sociology · Karl Barth and Christian Theology · Law · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology