Big Philosophical Questions
Why They Matter and Why They Are Still Around
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3972073 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Iris Vidmar (0000-0003-3780-6457, University of Rijeka, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 403-415 |
| Publication date | 2018-05-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The European Legacy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1084-8770 • E-ISSN: 1470-1316 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10848770.2018.1438872 |
| OpenAlex | W2793657225 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 8 |
Big philosophical questions—about the mind, the idea of the good, justice, beauty, knowledge—have been the prime interest of philosophers ever since Plato first raised them in his dialogues. However, regardless of how hard philosophers have been trying to find answers to them, it seems that all they have ever managed to do was to find reasons for disagreements, and, on the whole, to have failed to reach a consensus on pretty much anything. Some philosophers now claim that there hasn’t been much progress in philosophy, especially when compared to the sciences. I take up this verdict and try to refute it, first by offering an alternative view on what counts as progress, and then by analyzing big philosophical questions and their relevance for our intellectual and practical pursuits. I argue that, due to the distinctive nature of philosophical curiosity, coming up with answers to the big philosophical questions is an ideal that can hardly be met, but that philosophy nevertheless delivers various benefits, intellectual and practical, which the proponents of the No-Progress View tend to ignore
Curiosity · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Philosophical methodology · Philosophical theory · Political science · Social science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |