Interpretation and the limits of interpretability

On rethinking Clifford Geertz's semiotics of religious experience

Bibliographic Data

ID3978783
AuthorsC Jason Throop (0000-0002-2631-5460, University of California, Los Angeles, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume14
Issue3-4
Pages369-384
Publication date2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of North African Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1362-9387 • E-ISSN: 1743-9345
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13629380902924018
OpenAlexW2061236201
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited24

This paper critically interrogates Clifford Geertz's analysis of religious belief as it relates to both his broader semiotics of culture and his views on how such beliefs are implicated in the formation of particular dispositions, propensities, and habits informing social action. It is argued that Geertz's account of religion can be held to reveal some of the most central assumptions of his social theory, his hermeneutics of culture, and his philosophy of action. Keywords: Michel FoucaultClifford GeertzWilliam Jamesperson-centered ethnographyphenomenologypracticereligionsubjectivity Acknowledgements I would like to thank Susan Slyomovics for graciously inviting me to participate in the conference that led to the development of this collection of essays and for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this essay. The paper also greatly benefited from the insightful comments made by my fellow panelists, Lahouari Addi, Abdellah Hammoudi, and Paul Rabinow. Finally, I would like to thank Douglas Hollan for providing me with critical and constructive comments that helped to substantially improve the paper. Notes As Eric Paras observes, 'The definition of the subject that Foucault offered at the beginning of 1980s, if it is to be judged coherent, necessarily carried within it the ideas of autonomy, reflexivity, and lived experience... the Foucauldian subject of 1980 was a free individual. It had the ability to pursue (or not pursue) techniques that would transform its subjectival modality – but which would not, one way or the other, disrupt its status as an independent locus of experience' (Paras 2006 Paras, E. 2006. Foucault 2.0: beyond power and knowledge, New York: Other Press. [Google Scholar], p. 123). According to Foucault, forms of subjectivation include at least four different aspects: 1) determination of the ethical substance; 2) reliance upon particular modes of subjection; 3) specified technologies of self; and 4) orientation toward a predetermined telos. In his words, the formation of ethical subjectivity is 'a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice [i.e., ethical substance], defines his position relative to the precept he will follow [i.e., mode of subjection], and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal [i.e., telos]. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself [i.e., technologies of self]' (Foucault 1985 Foucault, M. 1985. The use of pleasure, New York: Pantheon Books. R. Hurley, trans [Google Scholar], p. 28). While it has often been the case that Western philosophers since the 1800s have sought to make a rather strict distinction between aesthetic and moral forms of judgment, it is interesting that when we turn back to early Greek philosophy there is much overlap between notions of the beautiful and notions of the good. For instance, the Greek term to kalon, which is often translated as 'beauty,' did not, however, 'refer to a thing's autonomous aesthetic value, but rather to its 'excellence, which is connected with its moral worth and/or usefulness' (Feagin 1995 Feagin, S. L. 1995. "Beauty". In The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, Edited by: Audi, Robert. 66Cambridge, , UK: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]). Moreover, for Aristotle, virtues (aretai) were themselves conceived as traits, capacities, and dispositions (e.g., justice, courage, temperance, generosity, intelligence, wisdom, etc.) that bring about happiness or 'flourishing' (eudaemon) on account of their relative 'refinement, beauty, or excellence' (kalos) (see Aristotle 1985 Aristotle. 1985. Nicomachean ethics, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. T. Irwin, trans [Google Scholar

Action (physics · Epistemology · Hermeneutics · Interpretability · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Religious belief · Semiotics · Sociology · Cross-Cultural and Social Analysis · Philosophy · Religion and Society Interactions · Religious Education and Schools