Testing Morocco

The parliamentary elections of September 2007

Bibliographic Data

ID3978828
AuthorsLise Storm (0000-0002-8696-485X, University of Exeter, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume13
Issue1
Pages37-54
Publication date2008-03-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of North African Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1362-9387 • E-ISSN: 1743-9345
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13629380701726804
OpenAlexW2081077254
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited4

With five years having passed since the previous parliamentary elections, the Moroccan electorate went to the polls as scheduled on 7 September 2007 in order to elect the 325 members of the country's lower house. Due to the fact that during the past decade elections have grown not only more competitive, but also freer and fairer, and with the rising popularity of Islamist parties in Morocco and abroad, the 2007 elections were hotly awaited. It was widely believed that these elections would serve as a test of Morocco's democratic credentials – that they would demonstrate once and for all the commitment of Mohammed VI to the democratisation process, the stamina of the political parties vis-à-vis the monarchy, and the strength and true nature of the largest Islamist party, the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD). This article argues that the overall picture that emerged was positive as fraud and manipulation were relatively minor, the country's new prime minister not only had party affiliation, but also belonged to the party with the largest share of the seats in parliament, and the PJD had proved that although the party was a force to be reckoned with, it was far from being as strong as many had believed or indeed feared. Keywords: MoroccoelectionsdemocracyIslamistspopular dissatisfaction Notes 1. The subject of low voter turnout is treated in detail below. For a graphic illustration, see Figure 1. 2. These allegations were confirmed during the author's interviews with the Moroccan academics Rkia el-Mossadeq and Amina el-Messaoudi, Rabat and Fès, 24–28 March 2005. 3. See also Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal (2006) Mohsen-Finan, K. and Zeghal, M. 2006. Opposition islamiste et pouvoir monarchique au Maroc. Le cas du Parti de la Justice et du Développement au Maroc. Revue Française du science politique, 56(1): 79–119. [Google Scholar] and Zeghal (2005) Zeghal, M. 2005. Les Islamistes Marocains: Le Défi à la Monarchie, Paris: Éditions La Découverte. [Google Scholar]. 4. It should be mentioned that the union aligned with the PJD – the Union Nationale des Travailleurs (UNMT) – won one of the nine seats filled by the trade unions (Ridouane 2006b Ridouane, K. 2006b. Chambre des conseillers: la Justice engagera des poursuites. L'Economiste, 11 September [Google Scholar]). Please note that in the local elections held on 12 September 2003, the PJD won 4.48% of the valid votes, and 2.58% of the contested seats. In comparison the Istiqlal and the USFP won 15.68 and 13.86% of the valid votes cast, and 16.96 and 14.70%, respectively, of the seats (Moroccan Ministry of Communication 2003 Moroccan Ministry of Communication. 2003. Discours du ministre de l'Intérieur à l'occasion de la proclamation des résultats des élections communales du 12 septembre. 13 September [Google Scholar]). 5. It should be noted that there is far from agreement that the PJD was pursuing such a strategy. Mohsen-Finan and Zeghal (2006) Mohsen-Finan, K. and Zeghal, M. 2006. Opposition islamiste et pouvoir monarchique au Maroc. Le cas du Parti de la Justice et du Développement au Maroc. Revue Française du science politique, 56(1): 79–119. [Google Scholar], among others, claim that the PJD followed the complete opposite strategy: the number one priority of the party was not the parliamentary elections of 2007, but the municipal elections scheduled for 2009. In other words, national representation was less important than local representation. 6. It is interesting to note that when IRI surveys first emerged, key PJD figures publicly proclaimed that opinion polls cannot be trusted, and that the polls carried out until then could not be trusted as they had not been scientific in nature but mere speculations (Alaoui 2005 Alaoui, M. 2005. Politique. Le PJD fait du marketing. TelQuel, [Google Scholar], Bennani 2006b Bennani, D. 2006b. Les islamistes et le Palais vers un partage du pouvoir?. TelQuel, [Google Scholar], 2006c Bennani, D. 2006c. Elections 2007. La stratégie PJD. TelQuel, [Google Scholar], Boukhari 2006a Boukhari, K. 2006a. PPS. Le parti qui dit non au PJD. TelQuel, [Google Scholar], Ksikes 2006b Ksikes, D. 2006b. Exclusif. Étude. Le PJD à la loupe. TelQuel, [Google Scholar]). 7. Please note that this opinion was further supported by comments made by the academics Rkia el-Mossadeq and Amina el-Messaoudi in interviews carried out in Rabat and Fès in the period 24–28 March 2005. 8. It should be noted that although there had been rumours that elements within the USFP were not completely against a coalition that included the PJD, the official stance of the party had always been that the two parties were too far apart to be in government together, and although far from the ideal situation, the USFP would rather turn to parties such as the RNI, the MP, and the UC (Bennani 2006b Bennani, D. 2006b. Les islamistes et le Palais vers un partage du pouvoir?. TelQuel, [Google Scholar], Boukhari 2006a Boukhari, K. 2006a. PPS. Le parti qui dit non au PJD. TelQuel, [Google Scholar], 2006b Boukhari, K. 2006b. Réforme constitutionnelle. Les partis s'encanaillent. TelQuel, [Google Scholar], Ksikes 2006a Ksikes, D. 2006a. L'Union socialiste sans forces populaires. TelQuel, [Google Scholar]; and author's interview with Mohammed el-Yazghi, Rabat, 4 April 2005). 9. Author's interviews with Moroccan academics, politicians and political commentators in Rabat, Marrakech, Casablanca, and London during the spring of 2005. 10. See Table 2 for the full election results. 11. The speculations were so strong that the Mouvement Unicité et Réforme (MUR) went as far as to publicly plead with the PJD not to join the government but stay true to its principles (Dahbi 2007 Dahbi, O. 2007. Islamisme: Le MUR appelle le PJD à ne pas participer au gouvernement. Aujourd'hui Le Maroc, 13 September [Google Scholar]). 12. This has led some analysts to argue that the creation of the national lists constitutes a setback for Moroccan women as the political parties would otherwise have been forced to give priority to female candidates on more of the local lists in order to demonstrate their commitment to the emancipation of women

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