Pragmatism as Idealism? The Case of Mary Whiton Calkins
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4005002 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lisa Kampen (0009-0000-3476-8673, Center for the History of Philosophy and Science, Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Radboud University Nijmegen the Netherlands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | e70028-e70028 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-5061 • E-ISSN: 1520-6696 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/jhbs.70028 |
| PMID | 40450712 |
| OpenAlex | W4410930777 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 41 |
American pragmatism is traditionally described as a logico-philosophical movement that arose in opposition to the theological and metaphysical assumptions of the early American idealists. Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) challenges this narrative in two central ways: she presents pragmatism as encompassing psychological, logical, and metaphysical doctrines, and she characterizes "metaphysical pragmatism" as a form of idealism. This paper offers a systematic reconstruction of Calkins's philosophical and psychological commitments to explain these challenges to the traditional narrative. The first part proposes that Calkins's taxonomy of "pragmatisms" reflects her views on the proper roles of philosophy and psychology. During a time when psychology was separating from philosophy, Calkins argued that psychology should study reality as experienced through introspection, while philosophy should address the metaphysical nature of the realities experienced. The second part of this article explores Calkins's rationale for characterizing metaphysical pragmatism as idealism. She understood the pluralism characteristic of pragmatism as a "pluralistic personalism", where reality is the nature of consciousness, and consciousness is viewed as a plurality of conscious selves. Calkins rejected metaphysical pragmatism because she believed that pluralism could not account for absolute truth. However, she maintained support for psychological pragmatism, believing it to be metaphysically neutral. The article concludes with a brief critical analysis of Calkins's position on pragmatism as regards her philosophy-psychology distinction and the supposed opposition between pragmatism and metaphysics more broadly
Epistemology · Idealism · Metaphysics · Narrative · Personalism · Pluralism (philosophy · Pragmatism · Sociology · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
A History of Philosophy in America
Reconstruction in philosophy.
Psychology.
Pragmatism
The reflex arc concept in psychology.
The Oxford Handbook of William James
Idealism
The Real Metaphysical Club
Henri Bergson
Self and Soul
Psychology as Science of Selves
American Women Philosophers 1650-1930
Mary Whiton Calkins
Scientific Objectivity and E. B. Titchener's Experimental Psychology
The principles of psychology
The self-psychology of Mary Whiton Calkins
The metaphysical club
Between Peirce (1878) and James (1898)
Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) fourteenth president of the American Psychological Association
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |