The Ewo Filature

A Study in the Transfer of Technology to China in the 19th Century

Bibliographic Data

ID4020092
AuthorsShannon R Brown (corresponding author)
Year1979
Volume20
Issue3
Pages550
Publication date1979-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueTechnology and Culture (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-165X • E-ISSN: 1097-3729
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/3103816
OpenAlexW2313707083
LanguageEN
Citations received12

s of Chinese and Japanese Works on Chinese History, no. 5 (Ann Arbor, 1976), p. 51. In 1894 silk reeled in Western-style filatures was only 5 percent of Chinese raw silk exports, but it rose rapidly thereafter, to 29 percent in 1895, 38 percent in 1896, and 42 percent in 1897, before leveling off in the 50-60 percent range during 1902-15 (Inspector General of Cusoms [n. 9], pp. 203-4). 39Indicated capitalization of the firm was 60 shares of 1,000 Shanghai taels each. Jardine Matheson was assigned 24 shares; Aries Dufour (a silk firm in France), 6 shares; an employee of Jardine Matheson, one share; 28 were assigned to Chinese merchants clearly associated with a silk trading company. One share was assigned to a Chinese associated with the American firm of Russell & Co., which was also involved in the silk trade (Articles of Agreement, July 11, 1882, Jardine Matheson Archives, University Library, Cambridge University, B 11). 40In Japan the government played an active role in modernizing sericulture and the silk industry, going so far as to construct three modern reeling mills. mills, constructed between 1870 and 1872, were established to demonstrate the superiority of Western technology and to train Japanese women as reelers. Japan's success in modernizing the silk industry resulted in the rapid expansion of silk exports, which consistently amounted to nearly half of merchandise exports until the end of the century. For a This content downloaded from 157.55.39.105 on Fri, 07 Oct 2016 04:58:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Ewo Filature 567 experience of the first Ewo filature by itself does suggest, however, some basic difficulties that must have confronted other efforts to transfer Western technology to China in the 19th century.41 In particular, it underlines the importance of the costs of adoption, especially the social costs that attend the displacement of existing techniques, values, and institutions. Because the filature was located in the treaty port of Shanghai, it could be built at an acceptable cost consistent with technical efficiency. There, also, a good quality labor force was recruited, trained, and employed to produce a high quality silk which sold well in foreign markets. In short, as long as the filature was able to operate in the treaty ports where Western political and economic institutions shaped the environment, the success of the venture was primarily determined by market forces, and these were clearly favorable. In some of its activities, however, such as the purchasing and drying of cocoons, the filature was forced to operate outside the treaty ports in an environment where Chinese political and economic institutions were dominant, Here the silk guild, possibly supported by peasant reelers, was able to prevent a purely market solution. Given the large number of cocoon producers, it is a tribute to the strength of the silk guild that it so effectively frustrated Major's efforts. But credit must also be given to the small scale of the filature's demand, which provided little incentive for cocoon producers to evade guild restrictions or for the guild to come to terms with Major. Together, these factors insured that the price of cocoons would be raised sufficiently to cause the filature to fail. history of the Ewo filature provides a clear illustration of the subtle manner in which technological, economic, and cultural elements intermingle to determine success in the transfer of technology. Although the establishment of the Ewo filature entailed the complex transfer of mechanical knowledge, manual skills, and the introduction of a new organization of labor, its backers were correct in their belief that Western technology would be more productive and, according to discussion of the important role that the silk industry played in Japanese economic development, see Hemmi, pp. 303-23. On the introduction of Western-style filatures, see Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880 (Stanford, 1955), pp. 54-60. 41The Ewo filature was not only the first modern silk filature to be established in China, it was also one of the earliest moder industries of any kind. One listing shows only fifteen modern industrial enterprises founded between 1843 and the establishment of the filature. fifteen included eight ship repair facilities, four printing establishments, one chemical firm, one bakery, and one freight packing company (Sun Yu-t'ang, ed., Chung-kuo chin-tai kung-yeh shih tzu-liao, ti-i-chi, 1840-1895 nien [Source materials on the history of modern industry in China, first collection, 1840-1895] [Peking, 1957], 1:234-35). This content downloaded from 157.55.39.105 on Fri, 07 Oct 2016 04:58:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 568 Shannon R. Brown all indications, would also be profitable. Yet, despite its location in the Western atmosphere of the treaty port of Shanghai, the filature could not operate in isolation from the traditional institutions and values of Chinese society. And, by itself, it could not provide sufficient stimulus to transform them. Only the government could do that. In the absence of a government committed to economic development, market forces alone could not overcome vested-interest opposition and insure success even in the transfer of a demonstrably superior technology.42 42It is interesting to observe that the British Consul in Shanghai saw the problem in similar terms. A year after the failure of the filature, he wrote: The difficulty to be overcome is the objection of Chinese to allow any improvement to be introduced of which they do not see the immediate advantage to themselves; and so strong are they in their combinations, and so much in their power are the small producers that, with the competition now existing between foreigners, they can carry almost any measure, however absurd (British Sessional Papers [n. 37 above], p. 145). This content downloaded from 157.55.39.105 on Fri, 07 Oct 2016 04:58:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Aesthetics · Archaeology · Art · China · Economics · International trade · Late 19th century · Period (music) · Technology transfer · History · Silk-based biomaterials and applications · Silkworms and Sericulture Research

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub